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ECOLOGICAL INTERFACE DESIGN:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Kim J. Vicente and Jens Rasmussen1
ABSTRACT
A theoretical framework for designing interfaces for complex human-
machine systems is proposed.  The framework, called ecological interface
design (EID), is based on the skills, rules, knowledge taxonomy of cognitive
control.  The basic goal of EID is twofold: first, not to force processing to a
higher level than the demands of the task require, and second, to support
each of the three levels of cognitive control.  Thus, an EID interface should
not contribute to the difficulty of the task, and at the same time, it should
support the entire range of activities that operators will be faced with.  Three
prescriptive design principles are suggested to achieve this objective, each
directed at supporting a particular level of cognitive control.  In this paper,
the theoretical foundations of the framework are laid out.  Particular atten-
tion is paid to presenting a coherent deductive argument justifying the prin-
ciples of EID.  In addition, three sources of converging support for the
framework are presented.  First, a review of the relevant psychological and
cognitive engineering literature reveals that there is a considerable amount
of research that is consistent with the principles of EID.  Second, an exami-
nation of other approaches to interface design indicates that EID has a
unique and significant contribution to make.  Third, the results of an initial
empirical evaluation also provide some preliminary support for the EID
framework.  The paper ends by outlining some issues for future research.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a novel theoretical framework for interface design for
complex human-machine systems.  The framework, called ecological inter-
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2face design (EID), is an attempt to extend the benefits of direct manipulation
interfaces (DMI) to complex work domains.  Unfortunately, existing theories
of DMI [41, 97] were not specifically developed with complex human-
machine systems in mind.  As a result, it should not be surprising to find
that these theories do not effectively address the unique challenges posed by
complex work domains [88].  The first step towards developing a more ap-
propriate design framework, then, is to identify the important challenges as-
sociated with the design of complex human-machine systems.  The discus-
sion will take place within the specific context of process control, although
the issue of generalizability to other work domains will be addressed later in
the paper.
A. Unanticipated Events
One way to classify events in complex human-machine systems is according
to their degree of novelty from the perspective of first operators and then de-
signers.  Three broad areas along a continuum can be identified:
1.Familiar events are routine in that operators experience them frequently.
As a result of a considerable amount of experience and training, operators
have acquired the skills required to deal with these events.
2. Unfamiliar, but anticipated events occur infrequently and thus operators
will not have a great deal of experience to rely on.  However, the events
have been anticipated by plant designers, who have built in means to
deal with them (e.g., procedures, decision support systems, automatic
controllers, etc.). These anticipated solutions provide operators with the
help they need to cope with this class of events.
3. Unfamiliar and unanticipated are also unfamiliar to operators because
they rarely occur.  Unlike the previous category, however, the event has
not been anticipated by designers.  Thus, operators cannot rely on a built
in solution but must improvise one themselves.
Ideally, one would like to alleviate the burden on operators by designing
plants in such a way that unanticipated events will not occur.  However,
there is a consensus that this is not a technically feasible option
[54,55,104].  As the Three Mile Island (TMI) Lessons Learned Task Force
pointed out [ 104], the set of events that is used as a basis for design does
not constitute an exhaustive list of events that can occur.  Rather, it con-
sists of a number of representative classes of scenarios that are judged by
designers to be of sufficient likelihood and severity that they are worthwhile
considering (e.g., [42]).  Consequently, there will always be a chance that
significant, safety threatening events have been overlooked and therefore
not included in the set of design basis events.  The inescapable conclusion
is that unanticipated events can and do happen in large-scale industrial
3systems.  In fact, they are the major cause of life-threatening accidents
[73,89].
What types of human factors problems are posed by unanticipated
events?  While human performance in routine events is primarily suscepti-
ble to alil?i (i.e., errors of execution) (cf. [67]), performance in unanticipated
events is limited more by mistakes (i.e., errors of intention).  The frequency
of slips can be reduced through the application of traditional ergonomic
guidelines; mistakes, on the other hand, can only be prevented by consid-
ering the cognitive factors influencing operator behavior [1 16].  It follows,
therefore, that the demands posed by unanticipated events cannot be over-
come simply by designing an interface with well laid out and clearly labelled
controls and displays.  Yet much of the work that has been done on inter-
face design for complex systems has focussed on these types of ergonomic
issues rather than on semantic issues (e.g., [47, 1021).
As a result, it should not be surprising to find that traditional interface
design practices do not provide operators with the support they need for
coping with this class of events.  The TMI accident, for instance, made it
patently clear that traditional control rooms provide operators with inade-
quate information to reflect plant status under unanticipated event se-
quences [103].  Subsequent efforts to identify the information set needed by
operators to deal with off-normal events have tended to adopt a common
approach.  A set of events is selected, and then the information needed to
diagnose each event sequence is determined (e.g., [47, 102]).  But this type
of procedure for determining what information should be included in an in-
terface cannot, by definition, cope with unanticipated events.  Clearly, an
alternative approach is required.
B. Outline
This paper will develop a framework for interface design that attempts to
support operators during familiar, unfamiliar, and in particular, unantici-
pated events.  The structure of the paper is as follows.  First, a generic
structure describing the interface design problem is defined.  To anticipate,
this problem formulation leads to two questions that must be addressed by
a design framework, specification of information content and design of vis-
ual form.  In the next section, the abstraction hierarchy is proposed as a
psychologically relevant framework that allows one to specify the informa-
tion content of an interface in a way that provides operators with a basis for
coping with unanticipated events.  Then, the skills, rules, knowledge taxon-
omy is used to integrate_ a variety of findings from the literature so as to de-
rive inferences for how information should be presented in an interface.
These theoretical developments provide the justification and context for the
description of the three principles composing the EID framework.  A review
4of other approaches to interface design is then undertaken to determine the
contribution of the EID framework.  Finally, the results of an initial empiri-
cal evaluation of one of the principles of the EID framework is also briefly
presented.
C. Relation to Previous Work
The EID framework was first proposed in [88].  The goal of that paper was to
describe the relationship between different classes of errors and the impli-
cations those errors had for interface design.  In a subsequent paper f 107],
a detailed design example for a therrnal-hydraulic process simulation was
presented, showing how the principles of EID can be applied in a prescrip-
tive manner to develop a concrete design product.  In addition, the concep-
tual ties between E]ID and ecological psychology were also pointed out at
length.  The emphasis of the present paper is on making explicit, in detail,
the rationale behind the principles of EID by reviewing the theoretical and
empirical evidence pertaining to the problems addressed by the framework.
Therefore, in addition to presenting a coherent deductive argument justifying the
EID principles, the present paper also puts the EID framework within a more
global context defined by psychological and cognitive engineering literature.  Those
interested in a detailed example of how the ideas presented here can be applied are
referred to [ 107].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section is directed at formulating the problem of interface design from a
research perspective.  The goal here is not to develop design principles (this
will be addressed later), but to first structure the problem in a meaningful
way.  The resulting structure will define the set of questions that must be
addressed by the framework to be developed in the remainder of the paper.
A. Fundamentals
An interface is part of a control system involving human and machine
components.  The operation of any control system is bound by the laws of
control theory, which provides a generic language for describing such sys-
tems.  Accordingly, it is important to consider the various fundamental con-
straints that the discipline of control theory places on systems design.
First, the Law of Requisite Variety [2] states that complex systems require
complex controllers.  It follows, then, that in designing a human-machine
system, the complexity inherent in the process cannot be displaced if effec-
5tive control is to be achieved.  That complexity must be dealt with in one
way or another, whether it be by the designer, the machine, or the operator.
Second, it is important to realize that physical systems can be described by
a set of constraints.  Examples of possible sources of constraint include the
purposes for which the system was designed, natural laws governing system
behavior, organizational or legal policies, the nature of the functions that
have been built into the system, the characteristics of the equipment avail-
able to carry out those functions, and the spatial topology and appearance
of the system components.  Third, it is well known in linear systems theory
that, implicitly or explicitly, every good controller must be, or possess, a
model of the system it is controlling [ 14, 24].  These last two points imply
that, in order to properly control the process, the human-machine system
must take into account, or embody, the constraints inherent in the work
domain [101].  In other words, optimal control requires a consideration of
veridical system functioning.
Figure 1. The structure of the interface design problem.
B. The Structure of the Design Problem
As shown in Figure 1, two questions pertinent to interface design arise from
these fundamental considerations.  First' what is a psychologically relevant
way of describing the complexity (i.e., variety [2]) of the work domain?  This
requires a representation formalism for describing the work domain's con-
straints.  Such a representation defines the informational content and
structure of the interface.  Second, what is an effective way of communicat-
6ing this information to the operator?  Here, an understanding of the mecha-
nisms that people have available for processing information is required.
This would provide a basis for determining the form that the information
should take, the idea being that information should be presented in a form
that is compatible with human cognitive and perceptual properties.  These
two questions define the core of the interface design problem.
It is interesting to note that one of these questions is primarily related to
the characteristics of the domain, whereas the other is related to those of
the operator.  This structure is very similar to the organism-environment
reciprocity that is central to ecological psychology [8, 9, 27, 28].  In fact, this
duality between operator and work environment was one of the reasons for
calling this theoretical framework "ecological" (see [88] and especially [107]
for a much more comprehensive discussion of the numerous parallels be-
tween ecological psychology and E]ID).
Of course, there are other questions pertinent to interface design, such as
issues of context sensitivity [63, 113], visual momentum [ 1 12-1, and dia-
logue [ 109].  These are all important facets of interface design that are not
addressed by EID.  Thus, in its present form, the scope of EDD is limited to
the most basic functions of an interface, as laid out in Figure 1. These are
the core problems that must be addressed.  The other issues just described
address the additional roles that an interface must play in complex human-
machine systems.  Ideally then, work on these other problems should be
integrated with the EID approach to provide a comprehensive approach to
interface design.
In the following sections, two theoretical concepts are adopted to answer
the two questions just posed.  First, the abstraction hierarchy [77, 78, 80] is
proposed as a psychologically relevant form of representing the constraints
in a work domain in a way that allows operators to cope with unanticipated
events.  Second, the skills, rules, knowledge (SRK) taxonomy [75, 77, 79] is
proposed as a useful framework for describing the various mechanisms that
people have for processing information.  The goal is to adopt these two theo-
retical constructs as axioms and then to use them to derive a number of
implications for interface design.
III. THE ABSTRACTION HIERARCHY
The abstraction hierarchy is a useful framework for representing a work
domain in a way that is relevant to interface design.  The goal of this section
is to review the evidence supporting this claim.  First, the structure of the
abstraction hierarchy will be described.  Second, an argument showing how
an interface based on an abstraction hierarchy representation provides op-
erators with a basis for coping with unanticipated events will be put forth.
7Third, other research that relies on a set of insights similar to those on
which the abstraction hierarchy is based will be briefly reviewed.  Fourth,
evidence showing that the abstraction hierarchy provides a psychologically
relevant representation for problem solving will also be reviewed.  In the en-
suing discussion, it is assumed that the reader has at least some familiarity
with the arguments presented in [78].
A. What Kind of Hierarchy?
Different types of hierarchical structures have frequently been used to rep-
resent complex systems in a variety of disciplines (e.g., [1, 50, 58, 69, 98]).
However, there are certain properties which distinguish the abstraction hi-
erarchy from other types of hierarchies.  To better understand the distinc-
tive properties of Rasmussen's abstraction hierarchy (and its corresponding
benefits), the general class of hierarchies of which the abstraction hierarchy
is a subclass must first be defined.
The abstraction hierarchy belongs to the class of stratified hierarchies de-
scribed by Mesarovic, Macko, and Takahara [58], the properties of which are
listed below.
1.Each stratum, or level, of the hierarchy deals with the very same system,
the only difference being that different strata provide different descrip-
tions, or different models for observing the system.
2.Each stratum has its own unique set of terms, concepts, and principles.
3.The selection of strata for describing a particular system depends on the
observer, and his knowledge and interest in the control of the system.
For many systems, however, there may be some strata which appear to be
natural or inherent.
4.The requirements for proper system functioning at any level appear as
constraints on the meaningful operation of lower levels, while the evolu-
tion of the state of the system is specified by the effect of the lower levels
on the higher levels.
5.Understanding of the system increases by crossing levels: by moving up
the hierarchy, one obtains a deeper understanding of system significance
with regard to the goals that are to be achieved, while in moving down the
hierarchy, one obtains a more detailed explanation of the system's func-
tioning in terms of how those goals can be carried out.
In addition to these characteristics, the structure of the abstraction hierar-
chy is further specified by a means-end relationship between levels [78].
This is in contrast to other types of hierarchies which are often defined by
attributes which are not explicitly related to goals (e.g., spatial scale, tempo-
ral scale, authority, flow of information).  This explicitly goal-oriented nature
has important psychological implications (see below).
8Note that the properties just described define a family of representations.
In other words, the abstraction hierarchy is not a specific representation but
rather a framework for developing representations for various work do-
mains.  The exact number of levels and their content will vary from domain
to domain as a function of the different types of constraints inherent in each
work domain.  For example, five levels of constraint have been found to be
useful for describing process control systems [781: the purposes for which
the system was designed (Functional Purpose); the intended causal struc-
ture of the process in terms of mass, energy, information, or value flows
(Abstract Function); the basic functions that the plant is designed to achieve
(Generalized Function); the characteristics of the components and the con-
nections between them (Physical Function); and finally, the appearance and
spatial location of those components (Physical Form).  Regardless of the do-
main, however, the resulting representation will have the properties just de-
scribed (see also [78]).
What unique advantages are offered by a representation with such char-
acteristics?  The remainder of this section will address this question.  To
anticipate, an abstraction hierarchy representation has two important
benefits: it provides operators with an informational basis for coping with
unanticipated events, and it provides a psychologically valid representation
for problem solving.  Each of these topics will now be addressed in turn.
B. Coping with Unanticipated Events: A Historical Overview
An understanding of how the abstraction hierarchy provides a basis for
coping with unanticipated events is best acquired by examining its histori-
cal origins.  Because this information can only be found in technical reports
which are not widely known or available, a detailed discussion is warranted.
Although the abstraction hierarchy first appeared in a technical report pub-
lished in 1979 [80], it has its origins in a research program on complex hu-
man-machine systems that began in the 1960's at Riso National Laboratory
in Roskilde, Denmark.  This research originated with the concern of ana-
lyzing and improving the reliability and safety of complex, industrial sys-
tems, particularly nuclear power plants (NPP's).
Early efforts were directed at analyzing the reliability of plant equipment
and instrumentation [44, 87].  Further investigation, however, lead to the
realization that the reliability of such systems cannot be viewed strictly from
a technical viewpoint without considering the human element in the system
[84, 85].  It became apparent that the human operator plays a key role in
overall system reliability and safety.  This observation was supported by re-
views of 29 cases with major consequences to either plant or personnel in
the nuclear domain and of 100 accidents in air transportation [82].  The re-
sults of this analysis indicated that accident-causing errors arose because
9human operators were confronted with unfamiliar situations which had not
been, or could not have been, anticipated by designers.  In contrast, under
normal circumstances, a trained and experienced operator will often be able
to compensate for deficiencies in the interface [82, 83].  Consequently, the
sinl-le most i=ortant concern in improving system safety is to provide op-
erators with the support required to deal with unfamiliar and unanticipated
abnormal situations.  The subsequent research program that was under-
taken at Riso was primarily directed at developing a design framework to
deal with this challenging problem.
The first step taken in this direction was an engineering analysis of the
control requirements posed by unanticipated events [8 1 ]. Looking at the
problem at a fundamental level revealed several important insights.  First,
when the system is functioning correctly, it can be described by a set of
constraints that are imposed on the observed data set by the functioning
and anatomy of the system being controlled.  Because the system was built
in a certain way, for a certain purpose, there will be certain relationships
between variables.  These relationships can be described as constraints.
These constraints represent "rules of rightness" [74], or in the language of
Mesarovic et al. [58], it goals to be achieved"; to say that the system is oper-
ating normally is equivalent to saying that the constraints in question hold.
When a fault occurs, however, system structure and functioning will
change.  This means that the system is no longer governed by the same
constraints.  Consequently, an abnormality results in the breaking of one or
more constraints that govem the system under normal circumstances.
From this perspective, the task of fault detection is equivalent to detecting
the breaking of constraints.  However, to be able to detect such a change,
the states of all of the variables entering into the violated constraint must be
represented, otherwise it will not be possible for the operator to uniquely
determine if a constraint has indeed been broken.  The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that it is not possible to know beforehand which con-
straint will be violated.  The implication for interface design is that the com-
plete set of goal-relevant constraints governing the system must be repre-
sented to pen-nit operators to determine when a constraint has been bro-
ken, and thereby allow them to directly diagnose the abnormality. (For a
formal instantiation of this argument within the context of a specific process
control system, see [ 106]).
These insights eventually lead to the abstraction hierarchy, which pro-
vides a framework for identifying and integrating the set of goal relevant
constraints that are operating in a given work domain.  Each level in the hi-
erarchy represents a different class of constraint, or in the terms of Mesa-
rovic et al. [581, a different stratum (see the properties of stratified hierar-
chies listed in the previous subsection).  One way to think of the abstraction
hierarchy, then, is as a set of models of the system, each defining a level of
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the hierarchy [80].  Higher levels represent relational information about
system purpose, whereas the lower levels represent more elemental data
about physical implementation.
With respect to interface design, the important implication is that be-
cause higher order, functional relations are explicitly represented, it should
be possible for operators to determine when process constraints are broken.
(The qualifier is required because making the necessary information avail-
able does not guarantee that it will be attended to or interpreted correctly).
Consequently, developing an abstraction hierarchy for a work domain allows
designers to identify the information that operators need to cope with the
entire range of operating demands, including unanticipated events.
C. Relation to Other Work
It is worthwhile pointing out that the insights behind the abstraction hierar-
chy have been independently recognized and adopted by other researchers.
For example, Davis [15] discusses the need for multiple representations de-
fining different types of constraints in the context of troubleshooting.  He
describes an artificial intelligence program for troubleshooting digital elec-
tronic circuits that reasons from first principles.  Rather than relying on a
list of previously  enumerated faults, Davis' program detects a mismatch
between values expected based on knowledge of proper system functioning
and those actually obtained.  This allows the system to diagnose events
which have not been explicitly built into the system's knowledge-base and
which have not been encountered previously.
The general idea of exploiting redundant functional relations for diagnosis
has also been recognized by control theorists (see [25] for a review).  The
goal is to use an analytical model of the system as a referent for proper
system functioning, comparing this referent to the current state of the sys-
tem, and then analyzing the residual for an unexpected deviation signifying
a fault.  The difference of course is that the approach suggested here merely
attempts to provide the operator with the informational basis for performing
the diagnosis.  Responsibility for detection, diagnosis, and compensation is
left in the hands of the operator.  In contrast, control theorists have at-
tempted to design automated systems to perform all of these activities.
D. Psychological Relevance
From an engineering perspective, an interface based on an abstraction hier-
archy representation has the benefit of providing an informational basis for
coping with unanticipated events.  However, there are also psychological
justifications for adopting the abstraction hierarchy as a basis for interface
design.
1
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One important property of an abstraction hierarchy representation is that
higher levels are less detailed than lower levels.  This fact has important
psychological implications.  Shifting one's representation from a low (i.e.,
very detailed) level to a higher level of abstraction with less resolution makes
complex systems look simpler.  In effect, this provides a mechanism for
coping with complexity [86].  Metaphorically, moving up one or more levels
allows one to "see the forest through the trees".  Thus, part of the psycho-
logical relevance of the abstraction hierarchy lies in the fact that it allows
resource-bounded agents, as people are, to deal with systems that would be
unmanageable if they had to observe the whole system in full detail all at
once.
This advantage is not unique to the abstraction hierarchy, however (cf.
[98]).  Most, if not all, hierarchies allow one to observe systems at a less de-
tailed level.  From a psychological point of view, the unique and important
characteristic of the abstraction hierarchy is that it is explicitly goal-
oriented.  The various levels in the hierarchy are linked by a means-end re-
lation.2 This relationship provides a very important source of constraint that
can be exploited in problem solving.  Thus, search can be constrained by
initiating the problem solving process at a high level of abstraction, deciding
which part of the system is relevant to current goals, and then concentrate
on the sub-tree of the hierarchy that is connected to the subsystem of inter-
est.  To take a concrete example from electronic troubleshooting, one could
start off by examining a television at a relatively coarse level of description,
such as generic functions.  One could then identify the faulty function (e.g.,
the power supply) and then drop down to the next level to look at only those
components that are functionally connected to the power supply.  This is an
efficient form of search since all components not pertinent to the power
supply can be ignored (see Korf [50] for a formal treatment of the computa-
tional efficiency of this type of constrained search).  In summary, an ab-
straction hierarchy representation allows one to engage in goal-directed
problem solving in a computationally economic manner.
Note that this advantage is not enjoyed by other types of hierarchical rep-
resentations (e.g., partwhole hierarchies, or classification hierarchies).  With
                                      
2 Many studies in the cognitive science literature, conducted in quite disparate domains,
have observed that the knowledge representation of experts is organized in a functional
hierarchy [12, 30].  Since the abstraction hierarchy is in fact a "functional hierarchy", one
could conceivably reinterpret this generalization as indicating that experts' knowledge
structures in various domains are organized according to an abstraction hierarchy.
However, this would be going well beyond the data because, unfortunately, the precise
structure of the "hierarchical" organization observed in these studies has typically not been
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defined as a stratified hierarchy with a means-end relations between levels, can be viewed
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hierarchy" can indeed capture the structure of experts' knowledge representations
in various domains.
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these other representation forrnats, the links between levels are not neces-
sarily related to goals.  While it is still possible to examine the system at a
high level of the hierarchy to choose a subsystem of interest, the critical
point is that the sub-tree of the hierarchy that is connected to that subsys-
tem may not necessarily contain system components that are relevant to the
goals that the selected subsystem is designed to achieve.  In other words,
other hierarchies constrain search but not in a way that is explicitly related
to the purposes for which the system is designed.  It is this latter type of
constraint that is needed for facilitating goal-directed behavior.
If people do indeed reason within an abstraction hierarchy representation,
then this should reveal itself in several empirically observable ways.  First, it
should be possible to meaningfully map problem solving protocols onto an
abstraction hierarchy representation of the domain.  Several studies show
that this is possible.  In fact, there is a body of empirical literature leading
from Selz's [96] seminal work (see [26] for an English account), which illus-
trates the psychological validity of the abstraction hierarchy as a problem
space representation (see [77] for a detailed review).  For instance, Duncker
[20] found that verbal protocols of subjects solving practical problems could
be mapped onto an abstraction hierarchy representation.  The same obser-
vation was made by de Groot [17], who collected verbal protocols of the
problem solving activities of world-class chess players.  More recently, the
problem solving behavior of expert computer programmers has also been
found to be consistent with search through an abstraction hierarchy space
[1051.  Also, Rasmussen discovered that the problem solving activities of
professional troubleshooters performing real diagnostic tasks could also be
mapped onto an abstraction hierarchy of the equipment being repaired (see
[77, p. 1191 for a specific example).  Finally, Itoh, Yoshimura, Ohtsuka, and
Masuda [43] found that the problem solving behaviors of NPP operators
could be mapped onto an abstraction hierarchy representation of the plant
(see [43, p.101] for a specific example).
Second, one would also expect that subjects' problem solving trajectories
would begin at a high level of abstraction and gradually focus in on lower
levels, thereby exploiting the goal-relevant constraint provided by the hier-
archy.  This type of "zooming in" behavior has indeed been observed in vir-
tually each of the studies just cited.  These observations are also consistent
with recent research on problem solving expertise which has consistently
shown that experts spend a great deal of their time analyzing the functional
structure of a problem at a high level of abstraction before narrowing in on
more concrete details [30].
In summary, an argument was put forth to show that, in contrast to hier-
archies which are not defined by a means-end relation, the abstraction hier-
archy allows one to constrain goal-directed search in a computationally
economic manner.  Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that the
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abstraction hierarchy can meaningfully capture the richness of problem
solving protocols from complex and practically meaningful activities in a va-
riety of domains.  Thus, there is evidence to indicate that the abstraction hi-
erarchy is a psychologically plausible problem solving representation.
E. Conclusion
To conclude, there is converging evidence that the abstraction hierarchy is a
useful way to represent a work domain.  Not only is it a psychologically rele-
vant problem representation but it also provides operators with an informa-
tional basis for coping with unanticipated events which, as pointed out in
the introduction, are a major threat to safety in complex human-machine
systems.  This problem representation can provide the foundation for inter-
face design by specifying the information content and structure of the in-
terface (see [ 107] for an example).
The next question is: What mechanisms do people have to cope with the
complexity inherent in the domain?  Answering this question will allow one
to detem-iine effective ways of communicating the information in the repre-
sentation to the operator (the second design problem shown in Figure 1).
This will be the topic of section IV.
To anticipate, the strategy adopted here is to take advantage of the most
powerful resources that people have for dealing with complexity.  As New-
man [66] has noted, "People don't mind dealing with complexity if they have
some way of controlling or handling it .... if a person is allowed to structure
a complex situation according to his perceptual and conceptual needs,
sheer complexity is no bar to effective performance" (p. 9).  In order to adopt
this approach, one needs to know something about the different mecha-
nisms that people have for processing information, how these can be in-
duced, and what their relative efficacy is.  This set of issues will be ad-
dressed next with the help of the SRK taxonomy.
IV. MULTIPLE LEVELS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL
In the systems reliability and cognitive engineering communities, the SRK
taxonomy [79] has become a widely accepted framework for describing the
various mechanisms that people have for processing information [90, 94].
The basic tenets of the taxonomy are that information can be interpreted in
three mutually exclusive ways -- as signals, signs, or symbols -- and that
the way in 2 which information is interpreted determines which of the three
levels of cognitive control3 is activated -- skill-based behavior (SBB), rule-
                                      
3 Rasmussen's taxonomy of cognitive control can be viewed as a hierarchical control sys-
tem consisting of three levels.  The knowledge-based level is at the top, the rule-based level
is in the middle, and skill-based behavior is the bottom level.  Those not familiar with the
taxonomy are refer-red to [79] for a more detailed description.  Note that cognitive control,
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based behavior (RBB), and knowledge-based behavior (KBB), respectively.
Thus, cognitive control may depend on a repertoire of automated behavioral
patterns (SBB), a set of cue-action mappings (RBB), or problem solving op-
erations on a symbolic representation (KBB).
In this section, the SRK taxonomy will be adopted as an "umbrella" for
integrating a variety of research results under a common language.  The
theoretical constructs of SRK will then be used to make certain deductions
from these findings, which in turn, will lead to a specific set of recommen-
dations for interface design.
A. The Power of Perception
The three levels of cognitive control can be grouped together into two general
categories (cf [89]).  KBB is concerned with analytical problem solving based
on a symbolic representation, whereas RBB and SBB are concerned with
perception and action.  The distinction between these two modes of proc-
essing is common to most, if not all, human performance frameworks [90].
In general, perceptual processing is fast, effortless, and proceeds in parallel,
whereas analytical problem solving is slow, laborious, and proceeds in a se-
rial fashion.  Furthermore, because of working memory limitations, analyti-
cal problem solving also tends to be more error-prone than perceptual proc-
essing [89].  It is important to note, however, that the lower levels can only
be activated in familiar situations because they require that the operator be
attuned to the perceptual features of the environment.  KBB, on the other
hand, allows operators to cope with novelty.  Thus, this dual cognitive ar-
chitecture allows people to trade off processing efficiency for the ability to
deal with unfamiliar events.  No level is globally superior to any other.
There are two characteristics of complex work domains which make it
possible to apply this knowledge to design.  First, operators of such systems
are highly skilled and have extensive experience in controlling the system.
Second, interface design for complex systems consists of specifying an in-
terface for a single, specific application; generality is not important.  Thus,
issues associated with transfer between various applications do not play a
significant role because operators will almost always be dealing with the
same interface for the same process.
These two factors make perceptual processing (i.e., SBB and RBB) an at-
tractive possibility.  Since operators will have extensive experience with the
system, they will have the opportunity to attune themselves to the percep-
tual properties of the control room interface.  Also, the fact that operators
will be dealing with the same process means that, if a way can be found to
                                                                                                                  
as used here, is entirely unrelated to the definition of cognitive control provided by
Hammond and Summers [361.
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comprehensively describe the work domain, then the need for dealing with
novel situations will be minimized.  This, in turn, implies that the reliance
on KBB should also be reduced.  Together, these two characteristics of
complex systems suggest that interfaces should be aimed at taking advan-
tage of the processing efficiency of lower levels of cognitive control.
Is there any empirical evidence to support this reconunendation?  While
many researchers have argued for the immense power of people's perceptual
abilities (e.g., [9, 16, 18, 27, 28, 48, 49, 77, 89, 91]), only a few studies have
ever directly compared perception and analytical reasoning.  Brunswik [9,
pp. 89-93] seems to have been the first to empirically address the rela-
tiveefficacy of what he referred to as perception (SBB and RBB) and thinking
(KBB).  He presented subjects with a size constancy task in two different
forms, one requiring perception and the other requiring arithmetic reason-
ing.  The results indicated that in the perceptual version of the task, sub-
jects'responses were centered around the correct answer with a relatively
small degree of variability.  In contrast, with the analytical version of the
task, more subjects reported the precise correct answer than in the per-
ceptual version, but the standard deviation in performance was more than
ten times that obtained for the perceptual version!  Thus, whereas percep-
tion was rarely perfect but always close, thinking could be perfect but
sometimes led to extreme errors.  Given that perception is faster than
thinking, Brunswik [9] concluded that: "die balance sheet of perception ver-
sus thinking may thus seem seriously upset against thinking, unquestioned
favorite of a culture of rational enlightenment as the latter has been" (p. 93).
A second direct comparison of perception and analytical reasoning was
conducted by Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson [37], who refer to the
two modes as intuition and analysis, respectively.  They conducted an ex-
periment with expert highway engineers on three different judgements tasks
presented in various forms so as to differentially induce perception and
analysis.  Interestingly, Hammond et al.'s [37] results replicated Brunswik's
[91 finding that analytical cognition can lead to extreme errors.  Moreover,
when the effects of nonsystematic errors were removed, the results indicated
that perception was frequently superior to analytical thinking in terms of
the empirical accuracy of judgements.  In a related study investigating the
interplay of perception and analysis over time, Hamm [35] also found that
perception was more closely related to good performance than analytical
cognition.
While these results show that perception can be very effective, as the
authors themselves have pointed out, one must be very careful in general-
izing the findings.  In particular, it is important to realize that relying on
lower levels of cognitive control may not always lead to superior perform-
ance.  The claim being made here is not that perception is always better
than analysis but that the conditions characteristic of complex work do-
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mains are propitious for perceptual processing and that designers should
take this into account in designing interfaces.
B. The Propensity for Perceptual Processing
The discussion so far suggests that it would be highly adaptive to take ad-
vantage of the efficiency of perceptual processing.  Interestingly enough,
people naturally adopt such a strategy.  That is, people attempt to simplify
complex tasks by taking advantage of their most powerful cognitive re-
source.  In this subsection, a variety of studies supporting this claim will be
reviewed (see also [81, 89, 91, 92]).
1)   Two examples.  The work of Klein [49] provides a good example of
people's propensity for perceptual processing.  He and his colleagues have
conducted a series of naturalistic studies of expert decision making in the
domains of fire fighting, military operations, and engineering design.  The
data were collected by, first, identifying non-routine events requiring skilled
decision making, and second, conducting interviews to probe these events in
order to examine the nature of the decision making process.  Over a hun-
dred cases were analyzed.
Since the incidents examined were non-routine, one would expect that
decision making would be, to use Klein's terms, analytical rather than rec-
ognitional (i.e., based on KBB rather than RBB).  Surprisingly, the results
indicated that, even in such critical incidents, experts often relied on the
recognitional mode of decision making.  Such a strategy is adaptive in sev-
eral respects.  In terms of mental effort, the recognitional mode is less taxing
than the analytical mode.  In terms of effectiveness, recognitional decision
making allows experts to take advantage of their experience.  Because of
their wealth of experience, experts are able to quickly generate a plausible
action alternative, rather than generate the complete set of possible alterna-
tives, as analytical decision making models would suggest.  Finally, in terms
of appropriateness, recognitional decision making is much quicker than
analytical decision making, and therefore allows experts to effectively cope
with time stress.
Kirlik [48] has also argued that skilled performance relies heavily on per-
ceptual processing.  He had subjects perform a complex, supervisory control
task until they became proficient and then tried to model their performance.
Given the complexity of the task demands, one would perhaps expect that
subjects would have to engage in a great deal of analytical problem solving
to perform well.  Surprisingly, Kirlik [48] found that it was possible to ac-
count for expert behavior by developing a parsimonious model that relied
almost exclusively on perception and action.  Cognitive processing was only
required on the rare occasions when there was not enough information
available in the environment to uniquely select an appropriate action.  Kir-
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lik's findings lend plausibility to the idea that skilled performers tend to rely
heavily on lower levels of cognitive control.
These results, obtained with realistically complex tasks, reinforce the ar-
gument outlined in the previous section.  If one can design interfaces that
allow people to effectively take advantage of perceptual processing, then the
benefits can be great.  However, there is a major difference between the do-
mains that Klein and Kirlik investigated and those that are of concern here:
in complex, high technology systems, the goal-relevant properties of the
work domain typically cannot be directly observed by the unaided eye.
While the results cited above illustrate the proficient level of performance
that can result from exploiting lower levels of cognitive control, they do not
provide any indication as to how to derive those benefits through proper in-
terface design, nor do they reveal what can go wrong if the proper support
for lower levels is not provided.
2)   More examples and what can go wrong.  The problem with many ex-
isting interfaces is that they penalize, rather than support, operators' pref-
erence for lower levels of cognitive control.  An experimental study con-
ducted by Hollnagel [39] in the area of process control serves as an excellent
example.
Since the process being controlled is not directly observable, there are two
phenomenologically different types of control strategies that can be adopted
by operators.  Following Hollnagel [39], these will be referred to as surface
control (corresponding to SBB and RBB) and deep control (corresponding to
KBB).  Surface control is guided by the perceptual properties of the displays,
whereas deep control of the system is guided by the operator's mental model
of the underlying process.  While this surface/deep control distinction is
best thought of as a continuum, studies of process control environments
have often indicated that operators have a distinct preference for surface
control rather than deep control of the system (e.g., [81, 92]).  In other
words, process control operators have a preference for lower levels of cogni-
tive control.
Hollnagel's [39] experiment provides a typical example of this pattern of
behavior.  In his study, subjects tended to disregard the (abstract) func-
tional properties of the process being controlled, and relied on the (concrete)
perceptual characteristics of the display instead.  In effect, they often
treated the process as if it was physically structured as the display indi-
cated.  However, as is the case with most existing process control interfaces,
the displays were not designed to be complete, veridical representations of
the process.  In other words, there is no direct, consistent relationship be-
tween the perceptual characteristics of the display and the constraints de-
scribing process behavior.  Thus, it is difficult for operators to consistently
control the system by considering the surface features of the display alone.
As a result, the tendency toward surface control results in several classes of
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problems.  First, it is easy for operators to forget, and therefore fail to con-
sider, properties of the process which are not shown in the display.  Second,
because of the inconsistent mapping between the invariant properties of the
process and the signs provided by the display, the cues that operators nor-
mally rely on to control the system are imperfectly correlated with the state
of the system.  Thus, in novel situations, surface control will result in un-
der-specification [89] and human error [88] (see section V for an example).
Third, if functional relationships between subsystems are not explicitly rep-
resented in the display, operators tend to treat the subsystems as being in-
dependent of each other.  This tendency is enhanced if the two related sub-
systems are spatially distant from one another (e.g., [93]).  These findings
show how operators' propensity for lower levels of cognitive control can lead
to errors if the interface is not designed with this knowledge in mind.
This preference for lower levels of cognitive control is by no means limited
to process control systems.  In a study investigating subjects' ability to es-
timate failure probabilities from a fault tree diagram, Fischoff, Slovic, and
Lichtenstein [22] found the same pattern of behavior, which they labelled as
"out of sight, out of mind".  Subjects who were presented with diagrams that
did not contain all possible fault categories tended to ignore the categories
not represented.  This tendency persisted, although to a lesser degree, when
subjects were explicitly told to consider events that were not represented in
the fault tree.  The results also revealed that events were perceived as more
important when they were represented as two branches in the fault tree dia-
gram than when presented as one.  One plausible interpretation of these
findings is that subjects were basing their judgements on the perceptually
salient features of the diagram instead of on their conceptual knowledge of
the problem.
The findings of Hollnagel [39] and Fischoff et al. [22] have been replicated
by Smith [ 1001 in the domain of management decision making.  His study
compared the performance of two groups of subjects, one that was given a
deliberately incomplete problem representation in the form of a decision tree
diagram, and another that was not given any representation aid.  The find-
ings revealed that the incomplete representation actually impaired perform-
ance because subjects tended to rely on it as a comprehensive and veridical
representation of the problem, thereby failing to consider the important
factors which had been deliberately omitted from the representation.  Thus,
being provided with an incomplete problem representation can actually lead
to worse performance than having no representation at all.  This can be at-
tributed to the "out of sight, out of mind" phenomenon identified by Fischoff
et al.
A final example of the strong tendency towards surface control comes
from the domain of mathematics.  Several researchers in this area (e.g. [19,
57, 99]) have observed "the attraction of surface structure over deep struc-
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ture" [57, p. 77] exhibited by mathematics students.  In cases where the
mathematical symbols provide a faithful externalization of the underlying
concepts being represented, this strategy can actually be adaptive (cf. [31]).
However, the tendency for surface control can lead to problems when the
mapping between surface and depth is not an isomorphic one [57].  An ex-
cellent example is provided by Dufour-Janvier et al. [ 19] who discuss the
errors that children sometimes exhibit in using the number line as an aid to
solving problems.  This external representation consists of a horizontal line
with the integers labelled and marked by tick marks at regularly spaced in-
tervals along the line.  Just as in the studies reviewed above, students have
a tendency to equate this external representation and the mathematical
concepts being represented.  This strategy does not lead to trouble when
students are leaming about integers, but when the same external represen-
tation is used to reason about real numbers, several types of errors are
regularly observed [ 19, p. 1 17].  For instance, children think that there are
no other numbers, or at most one, between two whole numbers.  Further-
more, students also find it difficult to place a number if they cannot associ-
ate it with the gradations already marked on the line.  These examples
clearly illustrate that when the mathematical concepts (deep structure) are
not uniquely mapped onto salient perceptual features of the external repre-
sentation (surface structure), the tendency to rely on perceptual processing
can lead to significant and predictable errors.
Of course, there are several reasons why subjects in these various studies
would fail to consider information not explicitly represented in the display
made available to them.  The most obvious, of course, is ignorance [22].
Perhaps the reason why subjects in these studies relied almost exclusively
on the information in the displayed representation was that they did not
have any other relevant knowledge to rely on.  While this explanation may
explain the errors made by students learning mathematics, it cannot ac-
count for all of the available data.  The subjects in Hollnagel's [39] study
were control engineers, not novices, and thus should have had sufficient
domain knowledge to go beyond the information provided in the interface.
More direct evidence rejecting the ignorance explanation comes from the fi-
nal experiment reported by Fischoff et al. [22], where the subjects were
technical experts instead of novices.  This expertise manipulation did not
affect the previously observed tendency.  Both novices and experts failed to
appreciate the material on-iitted from the diagrams with which they were
presented.
3)   Conclusions.  Collectively, these studies provide strong empirical evi-
dence indicating that people have a definite preference for lower levels of
cognitive control, or surface control.  The work of Klein [49] and Kirlik [48]
shows the proficient level of performance that can result from this behavior.
The other studies reviewed above reinforce the idea that people have a dis-
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tinct tendency to engage in lower levels of cognitive control.  Furthermore,
these studies also illustrate the types of problems that are encountered if
the interface does not support this strategy.  The basic implication that can
be derived from these findings is that interfaces should be designed to allow
people to effectively meet the demands of the task by relying on lower levels
of cognitive control.
C. Skill and Task Effects
So far, evidence for the power of lower levels of cognitive control and for
people's preference for relying on those levels has been reviewed, leading to
the recommendation that interfaces should be designed to support percep-
tual processing.  At the same time, it is important to realize that just be-
cause information is presented in such a way that task demands could be,
for example, satisfied through SBB alone, higher levels of cognitive control
may nevertheless be activated.  The reason for this is that the form in which
information is presented does not directly determine which level of cognitive
control will be activated (cf. [35, 79]).  Several other factors are also impor-
tant.
In particular, the level of cognitive control will also vary as a joint function
of the level of skill of the operator and the level of complexity of task de-
mands.  Skill and task complexity are in fact duals, as Leplat [53] has
pointed out, so it is impossible to talk about one without the other.  The im-
portant point for the present discussion is that the psychological demands
imposed by a given task depend on the level of skill of the operator [53, 68,
75, 941.  As a result, the degree to which operators can effectively rely on
lower levels of cognitive control is a function of their level of skill and experi-
ence.  More experienced operators are able to deal with most task demands
by relying on lower levels of cognitive control (cf. [ 1 8, 49, 68, 79, 89, 94]).
In summary, the current demands of the task, the person's experience, and
the form in which information is presented all combine to determine which
level of cognitive control is activated.
Because operators may engage in higher levels of cognitive control (e.g.,
KBB) even if the interface is designed to encourage lower levels, merely sup-
porting the lower levels is not sufficient.  To be truly effective, an interface
should also support higher levels of cognitive control.  How can this be
achieved?  In order to determine the information requirements for each of
the levels of cognitive control, it is necessary to understand how the differ-
ent levels are related, and what the activities associated with each level are.
D. Interaction Between Levels
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' While it is possible to describe each level independently, performance of a
realistically complex task will usually require a simultaneous consideration
of all three levels of cognitive control [88, 89].  However, the activities asso-
ciated with each level are quite different from each other.  For instance, the
information required for on-line control of the current activity, and off-line
planning considerations may not belong to the same time frame, nor to the
same part of the problem space.  'ne information presented to the operator
will have at least three distinct functions in the control of a complex work
sequence.  Information must be available for activation of skilled routines,
control of the course of the routines, and monitoring the outcome of an ac-
tivity [1081.
The important implication is that the type of computer support required
to deal with these different classes of activities is not the same.  A fi-
amework for interface design must take this into account.
E. Implications for Interface Design
The path of reasoning followed to this point is summarized in Figure 2.
First, it has been argued that, lower levels of cognitive control tend to be
executed more quickly, more effectively, and with less effort than higher lev-
els.  Second, converging empirical evidence argues that people have a defi-
nite preference for carrying out tasks by relying on lower levels of cognitive
control, even when the interface is not designed to support this type of be-
havior [19, 22, 39, 57, 99, 100].  These two points suggest that information
should be presented in a way that allows operators to effectively rely on
lower levels of cognitive control.  However, even if information is presented
in such a way that a task can be accomplished using lower levels of cogni-
tive control, higher levels may nonetheless be triggered because the level of
cognitive control activated is determined not only by how information is pre-
sented but also by task demands and the operator's level of skill.  This, and
the fact that any reasonably complex task will require a complex interaction
between all three levels of cognitive control, suggests that an interface
should provide the appropriate support for all three levels.  Therefore, the
general goal that a framework for interface design should strive to achieve is
to design interfaces in such a way as not to force cognitive control to a
higher level than the demands of the task require, while at the same time
providing the appropriate support for all three levels.
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Figure 2. The deductive path leading to a basic goal for interface design.
The next step is to develop a set of prescriptive principles that will allow
designers to develop interfaces that satisfy this goal.  SRK provides a general
indication of how to do this, since there are constraints on inducing each
level of cognitive control.  For instance, SBB can only be activated when in-
formation is presented in the form of time-space signals.  RBB, on the other
hand, is triggered by familiar perceptual forms (signs).  And finally, KBB is
activated by meaningful relational structures (symbols).
V. ECOLOGICAL INTERFACE DESIGN
The preceding theoretical development, combined with a morphological
analysis of human-system interaction modes (cf. [108]), leads to the postu-
lates of EID.  The framework consists of three general principles, each cor-
responding to a specific level of cognitive control. ne intent is to develop a
single design that will simultaneously support all three levels of cognitive
control.  In this section, each of the principles will be described and their
theoretical significance within the context of process control will be dis-
cussed (again, see [107] for an application of the principles).  Although
many of the general ideas behind EID have been around for some time (see
[7, 81, 83, 1 1 1] and especially [32, 33]), the specific theoretical formulation
presented here is a new one.
A. The Principles
1.       SBB - To support interaction via time-space signals, the operator
should be able to act directly on the disl2lay. and the structure of the dis-
played information should be isomorphic to the part-whole structure of
movements.
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This principle attempts to structure the interface so as to take advantage
of SBB.  Because the operator cannot directly act on the plant components,
the motor control patterns at the SBB level will only be concerned with the
manipulation of objects displayed in the interface.  The use of a mouse or a
trackball is preferred to command languages for this task because it main-
tains the communication of spatial-temporal aspects of the perception-
action loop intact.  This is the familiar idea of control via direct manipula-
tion [97].
The mapping or coupling between perception and action is also critical to
SBB.  Skilled perceptual-motor performance is characterized by integrated
patterns of movements resulting in a very high capacity and speed in per-
formance.  A good example is musical skill [108].  As the musician's level of
proficiency increases, movements are aggregated together into higher order
chunks.  Whereas the novice must control at the level of individual actions,
skilled musicians can work at the level of complex sequences of actions.
The key requirement for attaining this type of skill seems to be the mapping
between the musical notation and the associated actions.  Thus, experi-
enced musicians are able to form higher order visual chunks of notes and
then directly map these onto a concurrent chunking of movements.  A
similar situation can be found in the skilled use of an abacus [108].
This suggests that in order to facilitate sldlled perceptual-motor perform-
ance in complex work domains, a similar mapping should be built into the
interface.  Thus, the interface should be designed in such a way that the ag-
gregation of elementary movements into more complex routines corresponds
with a concurrent integration (i.e., chunking) of visual features into higher
level cues for these routines.  In other words, the structure of the displayed
information should be isomorphic to the partwhole structure of movements.
This can be accomplished by revealing higher level information as an aggre-
gation of lower level information (e.g. through appropriate perceptual or-
ganization principles, see [23]).  In this way, multiple levels are visible at the
same time in the interface and the operator is free to guide his attention to
the level of interest, depending upon his level of expertise and the current
demands.  Developing such a hierarchical visual structure should facilitate
the acquisition of skill by encouraging the chunking process.  At the same
time, flexibility is maintained by not constraining people to attend to a spe-
cific level of description.
2.       RBB - Provide a consistent ome-to-one mapping between the work
domain constraints and the cues or signs provided by the interface,
This second principle attempts to support the RBB level.  At this level, the
display provides operators with signs that they use as cues for the selection
of an appropriate action.  The problem with conventional interfaces is that
there is no consistent mapping between the perceptual cues that they pro-
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vide and the constraints which govern the process' behavior.  This leads to
procedural traps [76]: novel situations where operators rely on their normal
rule set, but without the usual success (see also [891).
A poignant example of a procedural trap can be found in the events that
transpired at TMI (cf. [561).  Operators had adopted pressurizer level as a
cue for determining the total primary inventory.  This heuristic worked most
of the time, when the primary loop was in its usual state.  The problem is
that the operators were not aware of the boundary conditions under which
the cue was valid.  Thus, when the reactor coolant system (RCS) reached
saturation conditions with resulting void formation, the pressurizer level
was no longer a valid indicator of primary inventory.  Yet, operators used
the cue just as they normally would.  As a result, they incorrectly inferred
that there was a great deal of water in the pressurizer when in fact it was
mainly full of steam.
EID attempts to overcome the difficulty associated with procedural traps
by developing a unique and consistent mapping between the constraints
that govern the behavior of the process, and the cues provided by the inter-
face.  This should reduce the frequency of errors because the cues for ac-
tion, being based on fundamental process properties, will be uniquely de-
fining of the underlying system state.  This means that it is possible, in
principle, for the operator to often effectively control the system by relying
on perceptual cues rather than by having to resort to KBB. (For an excellent
set of examples of this point within the contexts of ship navigation and alge-
bra expressions, see Hutchins [40] and Goldstein [3 1 ], respectively).
There are two advantages to this strategy.  The first is related to mental
economy: the RBB level of cognitive control is less effortful than the KBB
level.  The second advantage of this design approach is that because there is
a 1: I mapping between symbols and signs, the operator can exhibit what
looks like KBB by merely relying on RBB. ne advantage of knowledge-based
control is that, being based on fundamentals, its applicability is not re-
stricted to specific conditions (e.g., frequently encountered scenarios) as
RBB often tends to be.  Therefore, the second principle of EID allows opera-
tors to take advantage of the cognitive economy of RBB while, at the same
time, preserving the wide applicability of KBB.
Returning to the TMI example, the interface should have provided opera-
tors with diagnostic cues that would have allowed them to directly see that
the RCS pressure had reached saturation conditions.  In other words, rather
than merely providing a heuristic cue like pressurizer level, the interface
should have provided operators with perceptual information that reflects the
fundamental constraints governing the process (in this case, the Rankine
cycle heat engine).  Interestingly, Beltracchi [4, 5] has developed an overview
display for NPP's based on a plot of the Rankine cycle in temperature-
entropy coordinates that is consistent with the EID philosophy.
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It is encouraging to note that the utility of this principle of EID has re-
ceived empirical support from a number of recent studies, which have
shown that visual displays possessing emergent features that map onto
goal-relevant constraints can lead to better performance than displays
which do not provide such a mapping [10, 95].
More recently, Kaplan and Simon [45] have conducted a very interesting
study of factors affecting how well people solve insight problems that pro-
vides indirect support for this design principle.  They presented subjects
with three versions of an insight problem which differed according to how
perceptually salient the critical attribute for solving the problem was.  The
results revealed that insight was greatly facilitated if the critical attribute for
solving the problem was displayed in a perceptually salient manner.  Fur-
thermore, Kaplan and Simon also observed that one of the key differences
distinguishing fast from slow subjects was that the former tended to pay
attention to the perceptual invariants in the display more often than the
latter.  But of course, paying attention to perceptual invariants will not be
productive unless those invariants are meaningful.  Thus, building inter-
faces where domain invariants are mapped isomorphically onto perceptual
invariants takes advantage of people's propensity for perceptual processing
so as to guide their attention to the meaningful attributes of the problem.
3. KBB - Represent the work domain in the form of an abstraction hierarchy
to serve as an externalized mental model that will sul2l2ort knowledge-
based problem solving.
This final principle attempts to provide the necessary support for KBB.
This is essential to the success of an interface since KBB is usually an ef-
fortful and error prone activity.  In part, the difficulty of successfully relying
on KBB can be attributed to the complexity of high-tech systems.  In these
domains, problem solving takes place within the context of a complex causal
network of relations.  It is, therefore, very difficult for operators to ensure
that all of the consequences of the action they select have been taken into
account and evaluated [21, 77, 89].
The approach of EID to this problem is to reveal the problem space, in the
form of the abstraction hierarchy, to the operator (see [107] for an example).
The third principle therefore inherits all of the properties of the abstraction
hierarchy described earlier: it provides a psychologically relevant domain
representation that contains the information operators need to cope with
unanticipated events.  In addition, this design principle facilitates KBB by
relieving operators of having to keep track of the complex causal network
they are reasoning within.  By making the abstraction hierarchy visible in
the interface, the EID approach is providing the operator with a normative
externalized mental model of the process that can support thought experi-
ments and other planning activities.
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There is empirical evidence to suggest that external representations of
goal-relevant domain properties can improve problem solving performance.
For example, Beveridge and Parkins [6] demonstrated that a visual repre-
sentation of Duncker's [20] x-ray problem served as a facilitator for analogi-
cal problem solving.  This particular study is important because Gick and
Holyoak [29] had previously found that a diagram had not improved per-
formance on the same problem.  However, Beveridge and Parkins were able
to show that the reason why Gick and Holyoak's visual representation did
not help was because it did not represent the critical features of the x-ray
problem in a perceptually salient manner.  In contrast, their own diagram
was specifically designed to represent the goal-relevant properties of the
problem.
Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon [51] also describe a study that provides em-
pirical support for the design principle proposed above.  They constructed
various isomorphic versions of the Tower of Hanoi problem to see how pre-
senting the problem in different forms affected performance.  One of the
findings to emerge from this study was that providing an external representation of
the problem to be solved can improve performance by reducing subjects' memory
load.
B. Limitations
Up to this point, a considerable body of literature providing both theoretical
and empirical support for the EID framework has been presented.  To pro-
vide a balanced perspective, however, the framework's limitations need to be
addressed as well.  The first three issues pertain to the use of the abstrac-
tion hierarchy.  First, there are limitations imposed by designers' knowledge
of the constraints governing the system.  If those constraints are unknown,
an abstraction hierarchy cannot be developed.  Thus, the approach will only
succeed to the extent that designers understand the system they are build-
ing.
Second, there is the question of robustness.  Because data from sensors
are inherently noisy [1 10] and therefore uncertain, and because the system
model on which the redundant constraints are based is never known exactly
[25], there will always be some deviation between expected normal behavior
and the data observed by operators, even under normal operations.  Empiri-
cal research is needed to determine how robust performance with an inter-
face based on the abstraction hierarchy is with respect to these sources of
uncertainty.
Third, there may also be limitations due to sensor technology.  In some
systems, there may be certain variables (particularly higher order functional
information) that cannot be measured with existing sensors.  In some cases,
however, it may be possible to overcome this limitation by the use of ana-
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lytical techniques (for an example, see the application of observer theory to
derive the compensated level for a system with non-minimum phase dy-
namics in [ 1 15]).
The final question that needs to be addressed is that of generalizability.
The ideas presented here were developed within the domain of process con-
trol, but the applicability and utility of the EID framework has yet to be
systematically explored beyond this context.  Nevertheless, it is important
that the issue of generalization of these principles to other domains be ad-
dressed.
There are several reasons for being optimistic about the applicability of
the EID framework to other work domains.  Some of these are conceptual.
The primary prerequisite for applying the framework is that the designer
have a description of t,-Ie goal-relevant constraints governing the work do-
main.  In principle, it is irrelevant what those constraints are, as long as
they can be described in some way so that they can then be mapped onto
perceptual features of the display.  This second step of revealing these con-
straints is, in principle, limited only by the designer's imagination and the
state of the art knowledge of how perception operates.  There are also more
pragmatic reasons for being optimistic about the framework's generalizabil-
ity.  Interfaces based on ideas very similar to those proposed here have been
built for the domain of information retrieval in libraries [34, 70, 71, 72] and
are currently being built for the domain of aviation [52].  The library system
has already been evaluated and the response from users has been over-
whelmingly positive [341.
To conclude, the EID framework is intended to apply to a wide variety of
work domains where operators are required to cope with unanticipated
events.  While the anecdotal evidence from library and aviation domains just
presented is encouraging, it does not provide a defensible basis for generali-
zation.  Until these principles are systematically applied to domains other
than process control, and the efficacy of such applications rigorously evalu-
ated, the generalizability of the EID framework remains an open question.
VI. WHAT IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF EID?
It is instructive to map the EID framework back onto the generic structure
in Figure 1. One of the advantages of having formulated the problem of
interface design in a generic form is that that structure can now be used to
compare EID with other approaches to interface design.  This can be done
by taking each of the questions in Figure 1, looking at the answers EID pro-
poses, and comparing these to the answers proposed by other researchers.
This analysis will reveal what characteristics, if any, distinguish EID from
other approaches to the interface design problem illustrated in Figure 1. The
two questions will be addressed in reverse order.
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A. Communicating the information to the operator
1) Direct manipulation interfaces. Clearly, the EII) approach has many
similarities to direct manipulation interfaces (DNU).  This should not be a
surprise since the intention from the start was to extend the benefits of DMI
to complex systems.  But does EID go beyond existing theories of DMI (e.g.,
[41, 97]) in any substantive way?
Existing theories of DMI tend to be more descriptions than explanations
or theories.  They mainly emphasize the fact that DMI allow users to directly
act on what they see in the display, as well as directly representing the ob-
jects of interest.  What is missing, however, is an explanation in terms of
human information processing capabilities.  That is, if DMI are easier to
use, then they must be allowing people to use processing mechanisms that
are more efficient or more effective than those required to use more tradi-
tional interfaces.  This is what the SRK framework provides EID that other
theories of DMI do not possess: an explanation of the benefits of DMI in
terms of general properties of human cognition as opposed to a description
in terms of the interface technology (e.g., graphics, mouse, pop-up menus,
etc.). This is a deeper explanation, rather than just a description, of the
phenomenon being investigated.
Being based on the SRK framework, EID inherits a rich set of concepts,
allowing one to make comparatively more precise statements.  For instance,
SRK points to the importance of describing the unique type of informational
support that is required for problem solving activities (i.e., KBB).  In con-
trast, none of the existing accounts of DMI make explicit reference to sup-
porting problem solving through interface design.  The fact that the SRK
framework provides a more fine grained language also means that it is pos-
sible to go beyond describing DMI to actually laying out explicit principles
for how to go about designing such interfaces.  This seems to be the crucial
difference between EID and existing theories of DMI.
2) Object displays.  EID is also related to current research on object dis-
plays (e.g., [3, 10, I 1, 95]).  The intent behind this body of work has been to
apply existing knowledge from the area of visual perception to design dis-
plays that have higher order visual properties.  Thus, not only will the ele-
ments be visible, but so will a more global relationship.  By mapping the
higher order perceptual relationships onto goal-relevant variables, certain
types of tasks become much easier to perform.  One does not have to inte-
grate the individual elements to make a judgement about some higher order
property of interest.  Rather, one can perceive the higher order property di-
rectly.
Research on object displays is directly relevant to EID principle 2, which
states that in order to support RBB, the perceptual cues (signs) in the in-
terface should directly specify process constraints.  Note that the principle
does not state how this should be done, merely that it is beneficial to do so.
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The work on object displays complements EID by providing specific recom-
mendations on how to create salient perceptual cues that can then be used
to reveal domain invariants.
3)   Technology-driven display design.  It is also appropriate to compare
EID with research that is directed at how to best take advantage of com-
puter graphics for building interfaces for complex technical systems.  Much
of this work (e.g., [46]) can best be described as building computerized
mimic or schematic diagrams.  The starting basis is the representation that
technicians or operators already use, and efforts are made to embellish
these representations with the powerful capabilities of dynamic, color
graphics.  The research emphasis is on making manipulations to the sur-
face features of the interface (the manipulations being dictated by the capa-
bilities that technology has made possible to date) and then investigating
their effects on performance.
Certainly, there is much to be gained from this type of research.  How-
ever, EID represents a different approach in that it starts off with knowl-
edge, not about what technological capabilities are currently available, but
about human capabilities and limitations, couched within the SRK frame-
work.  Thus, the EID approach is top-down whereas technology-based ap-
proaches are bottom-up.  One of the disadvantages of a bottom-up approach
is that new experiments are required every time there is a technological in-
novation.  In contrast, the findings obtained from a top-down approach are
not tied to any specific technological medium.
4)   Summary.  The differences uncovered in this cursory review suggest
that E]ID has a unique contribution to make to the problem of interface de-
sign.  While EID is certainly consistent with the idea of "making visible the
invisible" that is such a strong part of DMI, existing accounts of DMI do not
seem to capture the conceptual richness and resulting prescriptive capabili-
ties of EID.  It was also shown how current work on object displays fits into
the general framework provided by EID.  Finally, the contrast between the
problem-driven approach of EID and the technology-driven approach that
has dominated research on graphics-based displays was also discussed.
B. Representing the Complexity in the Domain,
With respect to domain representation (the first question in Figure 1), there
is much less literature against which to compare EH).  There are at least
two reasons for this.  First, the issue of domain representation is often sim-
ply not addressed.  Second, many researchers base their computer inter-
faces on the information that is already provided to operators in mimic dia-
grams and schematics (e.g. [38, 46]).  Typically, this involves displaying the
state variables and not much else.  However, there is no need to limit inter-
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faces to merely providing the same information that operators already have,
but in an electronic form.  The flexibility of computer technology provides
the capability for doing much more.
So far, the only alternative to the abstraction hierarchy that has been dis-
cussed is the default position of displaying the system state variables.  The
advantages of including the added higher level information represented in
the abstraction hierarchy in an interface have already been mentioned.  To
reiterate, the abstraction hierarchy is a psychologically relevant representa-
tion that provides operators with an informational basis for coping with un-
anticipated events.
1) Operator function model.  There is another formalism that can perhaps
be thought of as an alternative to the abstraction hierarchy.  Mitchell and
Miller [63] have proposed a discrete control model, called operator function
model (OFM), that can be used as a display design methodology.  It should
be noted, however, that the mapping between the abstraction hierarchy and
OFM is not a simple one.  The abstraction hierarchy is but one part of a
comprehensive methodology for performing a cognitive work analysis [77].
In contrast, OFM is a self-contained analytical formalism which attempts to
answer the following design questions: a) What data should be displayed? b)
How should those data be organized into screens? c) How should context
sensitivity be built into the display? d) How can information be presented at
various levels of detail?  In what follows, the abstraction hierarchy and OFM
will be compared only in terms of the respective ways in which they can be
used to detemiine what information to display in an interface.  Note that the
intent is only to compare OFM with the abstraction hierarchy, not all of EID,
since OFM is silent on the question of the form in which information should
be displayed.
OFM is intended as a normative model of operator behavior [63].  It has a
heterarchical-hierarchical structure, with the top level of the hierarchy rep-
resenting the control functions that the operator must perform.  Each of
these is mapped onto a set of subfunctions, which in turn are mapped onto
tasks, and finally onto actions.  The model also incorporates next-state
transition functions that represent the meaningful ways in which one can
move within the network structure.  An important property of OFM is that
these mappings are non-deterministic.  That is, OFM does not lay out the
single, idealized set of tasks and actions that are required to accomplish a
given operator function, but instead identifies the set of tasks and actions
which can be used (i.e., which are meaningful within the context of a given
function).  This display design methodology has been applied to a manu-
facturing system [59, 63, 64] and to a satellite ground control system [65].
How does this structure compare to that of the abstraction hierarchy?  It
is always difficult to compare frameworks that have been developed inde-
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pendently, each with their own unique language and theoretical supposi-
tions.  Fortunately, however, Miller [60] has performed an important service
by developing a generic set of systems theoretic definitions of terms for hu-
man-machine systems work.  These definitions can be adopted as a rela-
tively neutral language for comparing the abstraction hierarchy and OFM.
For the present purposes, the most important distinction made by Miller is
that between a structural representation and a behavioral representation.  A
"structural representation is one in which the structures which define the
system are defined directly in some set of objects" [60, p. 24].  A behavioral
representation, on the other hand, is a representation of a dynamic system
whose elements consist of system behaviors [60, p. 33].  This distinction is
relevant to capturing the difference between the two formalisms.  The ab-
straction hierarchy is a structural representation of the controlled system,
whereas OFM is a behavioral representation of operator actions.  While the
difference may seem subtle, it does have important implications.
With its emphasis on operator action, OFM requires that operator deci-
sion making functions be explicitly represented.  This means that, in con-
trast to the abstraction hierarchy, an OFM representation cannot support
problem solving activities which are unpredictable, such as those associated
with unanticipated disturbances in complex systems.  This advantage of the
abstraction hierarchy is most relevant in very complex work domains with
many degrees of freedom where the operator must deal with situations that
cannot be anticipated by the designer.
OFM's weak emphasis on providing support for unanticipated events can
be understood if one examines its historical origins.  The OFM formalism
was adapted from a methodology developed by Miller [59, 61] for developing
discrete control models (DCM) based on finite-state descriptions.  The DCM
methodology was intended to model "the set of discrete tasks by which the
system configuration and mode of operation is established, and the proce-
dures by which the team members' activities are coordinated" [61, p. 4].
This quotation reveals that the DCM was primarily directed at work do-
mains whose demands are primarily procedural in nature.  This emphasis is
substantiated by the domains to which the DCM approach has been ap-
plied.  The original application was to model three operators controlling an
antiaircraft artillery system [59, 61], and a subsequent application was in
modelling single operators performing a capture tracking task [62].  The
practical relevance of unanticipated events is not nearly as great in these
domains as it is in more complex systems, such as NPP'S.  Thus, it is not
surprising to find that neither the DCM nor OFM approaches explicitly ad-
dress this class of problems.
This comparison suggests that the abstraction hierarchy and OFM have
quite different properties because they are primarily directed at different
types of problems.  The abstraction hierarchy is intended as a work domain
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representation for complex systems where unanticipated events are the big-
gest threat to system safety, whereas OFM is directed at situations where
operators are required to dynamically select the relevant subset of data from
a very large pool to carry out predictable tasks.  This point is frankly ac-
knowledged by Mitchell and Saisi [65] who state: "Whereas Rasmussen pri-
marily addresses decision-making in novel situations, ... the operator func-
tion model represents decision-making in the normal operator functions of
monitoring, fine tuning, as well as predictable fault detection, diagnosis,
and compensation" (p. 574).  Therefore, the two models are complementary
in that the abstraction hierarchy attempts to lay out the constraints in the
work domain that are relevant for control, whereas OFM represents current
system state as a function of the current decision making function being
conducted4
2)   Goal-means network.  Woods and Hollnagel [1 14] also discuss a for-
malism, called goal-means network (GMN), that can be used as a domain
representation for interface design.  The GMN is actually a variant of the ab-
straction hierarchy, and while there are differences in detail between the
two, the GMN shares almost all of the properties of the abstraction hierar-
chy that were listed above.
Woods and Hollnagel [114] discuss how the GMN can be used as a basis
for evaluating the cognitive demands placed on the operator.  In particular,
they illustrate how the GMN can be used to collect and integrate data to
help operators answer questions about system state, and to map out prob-
lem solving situations.  For the present purposes, the GMN can be consid-
ered roughly equivalent to the abstraction hierarchy as a domain represen-
tation formalism.
3)   Summary.  Compared to the problem of how to display information,
there is little work done on what information should be included in an in-
terface.  Two potential alternatives to the abstraction hierarchy were identi-
fied, GMN and OFM.  The abstraction hierarchy and the GMN are similar in
nature, providing a hierarchical representation of the functional structure of
the work domain.  In contrast, OFM provides a behavioral representation of
operator actions that complements the structural representation of the work
domain provided by the abstraction hierarchy.  However, the abstraction hi-
erarchy has unique properties that are particularly well suited to the set-
tings it was meant to address (i.e., complex work domains with many de-
                                      
4 Although this issue has not been explicitly researched, it is likely that the choice
of model should be guided by the characteristics of the application.  OFM will
probably be more useful in highly proceduralized domains whereas the abstraction
hierarchy will be more useful for work domains where unanticipated events are an
important threat to system safety.
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grees of freedom where operators need to cope with situations that cannot
be anticipated by designers).
VII.  EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, an experiment evaluating part of the EID framework is
briefly described.  The subject of the evaluation was principle 3, which deals
with support for KBB or problem solving behavior.  According to EID, to
properly support KBB an interface should represent the work domain at
various levels defined by the abstraction hierarchy.  The experiment was
conducted in the context of DURESS (DUal Reservoir System Simulation), a
thermal-hydraulic process simulation which was designed to represent
some of the properties that make human-machine systems complex (cf.
[106]).  Two interfaces for DURESS were developed, one based on the prin-
ciples of EID and another based on a more traditional format (see [107] for a
detailed description of the two interfaces).  The latter, which was referred to
as the Physical (P) interface, only displayed the settings of the system com-
ponents and the goal variables.  The former, which was referred to as the
Physical/Functional (P+F) interface, contained all of the information in the P
interface and higher order functional variables as well.  These functional
variables correspond to the higher levels of the abstraction hierarchy.  Thus,
whereas the P interface contained only a subset of the levels of the abstrac-
tion hierarchy for DURESS, the P+F interface represented the entire hierar-
chy.  The purpose of the study was to determine how well these two inter-
faces supported problem solving in unfamiliar and unanticipated situations
(i.e., KBB).  A brief description of the experiment and some of the results
follows (for more details, see [106]).
Theoretical experts and novices viewed dynamic event sequences showing
the behavior of DURESS with the P and P+F interfaces.  As mentioned ear-
lier, the P+F interface represented all levels of the abstraction hierarchy
whereas the P interface did not.  There were three types of trials: Normal
where the system was operating correctly, Fault where a single fault was
introduced, and Random where the system's behavior did not obey physical
laws.  On each trial, subjects were asked to recall the final state of each of
the process variables and to diagnose the system state.
In keeping with the objective of studying KBB, the experimental condi-
tions were intentionally set up to evaluate how well the two interfaces sup-
port performance in novel situations and to avoid reliance on RBB (i.e., per-
ceptual processing).  Thus, the data were conducted under the following
constraints.  Subjects were not given any feedback during the entire ex-
periment.  They were only given one session to become familiar with each
interface.  Also, they did not receive any formal training on the operation of
the system or on fault diagnosis.  They were also not told what faults were
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going to appear, nor what the ratio of fault to normal to random trials was.
In addition, the form and layout of the recall display bore no physical re-
semblance to either interface.  Finally, subjects had to make a diagnosis af-
ter viewing the system for only 25 to 30 seconds.  In sum, subjects were
faced with unfamiliar events and were not given any external aids except the
interface itself.
Several interesting findings were obtained.  The P+F interface resulted in
superior diagnosis performance compared to the P interface, primarily for
experts.  This result indicates that including all levels of the abstraction hi-
erarchy can result in better support for knowledge-based problem solving
than providing operators with physical state information alone, and that
this result is due to a better match to the theoretical expert's mental model
of the system.  It was also found that diagnosis performance was signifi-
cantly correlated with memory for functional variables; accurate diagnosis
was associated with accurate memory for functional variables.  In contrast,
diagnosis performance and memory for physical variables were not signifi-
cantly correlated.  These results indicate that the higher-order functional
information represented in the P+F interface is important for diagnosis,
thereby justifying the argument for including higher levels of the abstraction
hierarchy in an interface.  The superiority of the P+F interface was also re-
vealed in the memory task; memory for functional variables (i.e., those most
critical to diagnosis) on meaningful trials (i.e., normal or fault) was better
with the P+F than with the P interface.  Furthermore, memory on random
trials was significantly worse than on meaningful trials.  This latter result
indicates that the memory superiority of the P+F interface on meaningful
trials cannot be attributed to differences in visual form between the two in-
terfaces since the visual appearance of the P+F interface is identical on
meaningful and on random trials.  Thus, the superiority of the P+F over the
P interface must, in part at least, be attributed to the added levels of ab-
straction in the P+F interface.
Collectively, these results are consistent with the following generalization:
An interface based on an abstraction hierarchy representation of the work
domain can provide more support for KBB than an interface based on
physical variables alone because it results in a better match to the theoreti-
cal expert's veridical mental model.
VIII.  SUMMARY
The framework described in this paper was motivated by a problem: how to
design interfaces for complex work domains.  The first step taken towards
solving this problem was to determine what type of demands were associ-
ated with the control of complex systems.  This analysis revealed that events
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which are unfamiliar and unanticipated pose the greatest threat to system
safety.  Thus, a viable approach to interface design for this class of systems
must be able to support operators during unanticipated events.  The next
step taken was to formulate the generic structure of the interface design
problem, the minimal set of questions to which any approach to interface
design must provide answers.  In the remainder of the paper, we developed
a framework, EID, that attempts to provide useful answers to these ques-
tions.  Both theoretical and empirical evidence was cited in support of the
proposed framework.  Furthermore, a review of a number of other ap-
proaches to interface design suggested that EID has a unique and useful
contribution to make.  Finally, an experiment providing some initial support
for the framework was briefly described.  As far as we know, this is the first
study to compare an interface based on the abstraction hierarchy with any
other type of interface [ 106].  The results suggest that the EID framework
may have some value in achieving the goal that was posed at the beginning
of this paper, i.e., to extend the benefits of DMI to the unique challenges
posed by complex humanmachine systems.
Nevertheless, it is clear that many issues remain unanswered.  There is
one in particular that stands out.  'Me experimental results cited above indi-
cate that an interface based on the principles of EID can lead to better per-
formance for theoretical experts.  It remains to be demonstrated whether
this performance difference between interfaces will still hold with subjects
who are not theoretical experts.  Thus, the next step planned in this re-
search is to give novice subjects extensive practice at controlling DLTRESS
with either the P or P+F interface and see how skill acquisition, strategies,
and performance on both normal and abnormal events vary as a function of
interface.  An experiment such as this would complement the one described
above by focussing on issues related to the rule-based level of cognitive
control.
There are also some ways in which the EID framework may be expanded.
In its present form, the framework only concentrates on revealing the con-
straints inherent in the work domain in a form that is easy to perceive.
However, there are other sources of constraint above and beyond those as-
sociated with the controlled system which could perhaps also be revealed in
the interface in a manner similar to that described above.  Examples include
the constraints imposed by the particular control tasks required of the op-
erators, the set of strategies that operators might adopt in performing those
control tasks, the boundaries for safe operation defined by risk analyses,
and regulatory policies and rules on system operation.  Each of these layers
of constraint needs to be taken into account by operators.  It would be in-
teresting to pursue the possibility of embedding and perhaps integrating
these various layers of constraint in the interface through multiple layers of
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visual form.  This idea, and the proposed experimental work described
above, remain as topics for future research.
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